# INTERPRETATION OF EXTRADITION TREATIES.
In my judgment these treaties ought to receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they should receive their true construction according to their language, object, and intent. I know no head of the French law for which an exact equivalent is to be found in the law of England. The English and French texts of the treaty are not translations of one another. They are different versions, but versions which, on the whole, are in substantial agreement.
Per Lord RUSSELL, C.J., In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 509; 65 L.J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277; 60 J.P. 132.
# ON APPEAL, NEW MATERIALS MAY BE PRESENTED TO THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION BESIDES WHAT WAS BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE,
Per DENMAN, J.: The Act itself requires the Magistrate to inform the prisoner that he may apply for a habeas corpus, and, if he is entitled to apply for a habeas corpus, justice must have power to go into the whole matter, and I think it follows that the Queen's Bench Division in some cases, if there be certainly fresh evidence and cogent evidence, it could not say for a moment that it would feel itself crippled by the mere fact that the Magistrate, upon much less evidence, or perhaps upon the same evidence had taken a different view of the matter.
Per HAWKINS, J.: If a man has a right to move for a habeas corpus in order that the case may be reviewed, it would be an absurdity to say that he might not enter into those matters which showed that he had been guilty of no offence at all; and by no means was the matter concluded by the Magistrate's decision that he be committed for trial, because the Magistrate does not sit, when he is committing for trial, as a Magistrate sitting finally to dispose of the case, and to give judgment upon it. I think that they (the provisions of the Act) are quite sufficient certainly to satisfy me that the Magistrate's decision is by no means binding, either in point of law or in point of fact, and that, when these matters come to be considered upon the habeas corpus, if the Judges have to consider the case, they must consider the case as it is before them at the time the rule is discussed, and I think that we are not bound by, though we pay respect to, what the Magistrate's views were.
In re Castioni, L.R. Q.B.D. 1891 (1) 149; 60 L.J.M.C. 22; 64 L.T. (N.S.) 344; 17 Cox C.C. 225; 55 J.P. 328.
(But see also later case of In re Arton (p. 23), L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (I) 509; 65 L.J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277; 60 J.P. 132, where Lord Russell, C.J., said: "We are not a Court of Appeal on questions of fact from him (the Magistrate). We have only to see that he had such evidence before him as gave him authority and jurisdiction to commit.")
(See also In re Arton (p. 23), L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 108; 65 L.J.M.C. 23, where Lord Russell, C.J., said "The Court is bound to see whether or not a prima facie case has been made out before the Magistrate.")
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# EX PARTE BOUVIER. France.
21st November, 1872.
QUEEN'S BENCH: COCKBURN, C.J., MELLOR and BLACKBURN, JJ.
42 L.J. Q.B. 17; 12 Cox C.C. 303; 27 L.T. (N.S.) 844. Committed for extradition, by Police Magistrate of Jersey, for "fuum et banqueroute frauduleuse." The French warrant had been granted upon a judgment of an Assize Court, on which Bouvier had been condemned on three several charges of abus de confiance, forgery, and fraudulent bankruptcy. Abus de confiance was not an offence included in the Convention of 13th February, 1843.
Contended: No power under the Convention or under the Act of 1870 to surrender for abus de confiance. No power to surrender the criminal inasmuch as no provision or arrangement had been made as required by section 3 (2) of the Extradition Act, 1870.
Affidavit of the officially appointed Counsel to the French Embassy put in as to the state of French law.
Held: That under the existing law of France such provision is made.
(See also case of United States v. Lawrence, 13 Cox C.C. 361)
(And see now Article IV. of the treaty with France of 14th August, 1876.)
# EX PARTE ELISE COUNHAYE.
Belgium.
23rd May, 1873.
QUEEN'S BENCH : BLACKBURN, QUAIN, and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
L.R. 8 Q.B. 410; 42 L.J.Q.B. 217.
Accused of complicity in her husband's bankruptcy.
Contended: (i.) Complicity in a fraudulent bankruptcy is not a crime within the Extradition Act.
A treaty cannot extend the Act. (ii.) The facts charged were committed before the Act was passed, and section 6 does not apply to crimes committed before the Act was passed.
(i.) The depositions were not taken before the Magistrate who issued the warrant as required by Article II. of the treaty.
(iv.) The depositions are not receivable not having been taken in the presence of the accused.
(v.) The Belgian warrant is bad, charging crime in France; and it is not for the same crime as the English commitment.
Per COLERIDGE, A.G. - Accessories before the fact are not mentioned in the Schedule to the Act because at common law they are in effect the same as principals, and aiders and abettors can by statute be tried as well as punished as principals.
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INTERPRETATION OF EXTRADITION TREATIES.
In my judgment these treaties ought to receive a liberal interpretation, which means no more than that they should receive their true construction according to their language, object, and intent. I know no head of the French law for which an exact equivalent is to be found in the law of England. The English and French texts of the treaty are not translations of one another, They are different versions, but versions which, on the whole, are in substantial agreement.
Per Lord RUSSELL, C.J., In re Arton, L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 509;
65 L.J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277; 60 J.P. 132.
ON APPEAL, NEW MATERIALS MAY BE PRESENTED TO THE KING'S BENCH DIVISION BESIDES WHAT WAS BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE,
of the High Court of
Per DENMAN, J.: The Act itself requires the Magistrate to inform the prisoner that he may apply for a habeas corpus, and, if he is entitled to apply for a habeas corpustice must have power to go into the whole matter, and I think it follows that the Queen's Bench Division
in some cases, if there be certainly fresh evidence and cogent evidence, it could not say for a moment that it would feel itself crippled by the mere fact that the Magistrate, upon much less evidence, or perhaps upon the same evidence had taken a different view of the roatter.
Per HAWKINS, J.: If a man has a right to move for a habeas corpus in order that the case may be reviewed, it would be an absurdity to say that he might not enter into those matters which showed that he had been guilty of no offence at all; and by no means was the matter concluded by the Magistrate's decision that he be committed for trial, because the Magistrate does not sit, when he is committing for trial, as a Magistrate sitting finally to dispose of the case, and to give judgment upon it. I think that they (the provisions of the Act) are quite sufficient certainly to satisfy me that the Magistrate's decision is by no means binding, either in point of law or in point of fact, and that, when these matters coine to be considered upon the habeas corpus, if the Judges have to consider the case, they must consider the case as it is before them at the time the rule is discussed, and I think that we are not bound by, though we pay respect to, what the Magistrate's views were.
In re Castioni, L.R. Q.B.D. 1891 (1) 149; 60 L.J.M.C. 22; 64 L.T.
(N.S.) 344; 17 Cox C.C. 225; 55 J.P. 328.
(But see also later case of In re Arton (p. 23), L.R. Q.B.D. 1896 (I) 509; 65 L..J.M.C. 50; 18 Cox C.C. 277; 60 J.P. 132, where Lord Russell, C., said:"We are not a Court of Appeal on questions of fact from him (the Magistrate). We have only to see that he had such evidence before him as gave him authority and jurisdiction to commit.")
(See also In re Arion (p. 23), LR. Q.B.D. 1896 (1) 108; 65 L.J.M.C. 23, where Lord Russell, C.J., said "The Court is bound to see whether or not a mrima facie case has been made out before the Magistrate.")
EX PARTE BOUVIER. France.
21st November, 1872.
7
QUEEN'S BENCH: COCKBURN, C.J., MELLOR and BLACKBURN, JJ.
42 L.J. Q.B. 17; 12 Cox C.C. 303; 27 L.T. (N.S.) 844. Committed for extradition, by Police Magistrate of Jersey, for "fuum et The French warrant had been granted upon a banqueroute frauduleuse.” judgment of an Assize Court, on which Bouvier had been condemned on three several charges of abus de confiance, forgery, and fraudulent bankruptcy. Abus de confiance was not an offence included in the Convention of 13th February,
1843.
Contended: No power under the Convention or under the Act of 1870 to surrender for abus de confiance. No power to surrender the criminal inasmuch as no provision or arrangement had been made as required by section 3 (2) of the Extradition Act, 1870,
Affidavit of the officially appointed Counsel to the French Embassy put in as to the state of French law.
Held: That under the existing law of France such provision is made.
(See also case of United States v. Lawrence, 13 Cox C.C. 361)
(And see now Article IV. of the treaty with France of 14th August, 1876.)
EX PARTE ELISE COUNHAYE.
Belgium.
23rd May, 1873.
QUEEN'S BENCH : BLACKBURN, QUAIN, and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
L.R. 8 Q.B. 410; 42 L.J.Q.B. 217.
Accused of complicity in her husband's bankruptcy,
Contended: (i.)-Complicity in a fraudulent bankruptcy is not a crime within the Extradition Act.
A treaty cannot extend the Act. (ii)-The facts charged were committed before the Act was passed, and section 6 does not apply to crimes committed before the Act was passed.
(i.)-The depositions were not taken before the Magistrate who issued the warrant as required by Article II. of the treaty.
(iv.) The depositions are not receivable not having been taken in the
presence of the accused.
(v.)-The Belgian warrant is bad, charging crime in France; and it is not for the same crime as the English commitment.
Per COLERIDGE, A.G.-Accessories before the fact are not mentioned in the Schedule to the Act because at common law they are in effect the same as principals, and aiders and abettors can by statute be tried as well as punished as principals.
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